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Abstract
Taking a benchmark scenario, the current situation in Switzerland, and using
a microsimulation technique, we compare the eﬀectiveness of various income
maintenance schemes for reducing inequality and poverty. A full negative in-
come tax allowance designed to eliminate poverty, is shown to reduce income
inequality most drastically. An integrated federal linear tax rate of 62% is re-
quired to make it viable. Aggregate work hours are reduced by approximately
10% and average disposable income falls by 9.3% under such circumstances. A
participation income restricted to adults in employment and covering 50% of
subsistence costs is however shown to result in an unambiguous social welfare
improvement over the current situation in Switzerland.
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11 Introduction
Undoubtedly, one of the principal goals of the welfare state is to provide a social
safety net for families whose incomes are likely to fall below a critical threshold,
and more generally to redistribute resources in an equitable manner. Because social
insurance schemes are often funded from income taxation, the government must
always trade oﬀ these justice objectives against the distortions caused by taxation,
especially when these result in signiﬁcant reductions of work hours of individuals
with a capacity to generate high earnings.
Alternative income maintenance schemes generate diﬀerent budget constraints
for households, and, in theory at least, diﬀerent labour supply responses. For this
reason, they will not be equally eﬀective at reducing poverty and inequality; likewise
they will not be equally costly in terms of tax revenue requirements. Hence, alter-
native income maintenance schemes may be taken to imply qualitatively diﬀerent
trade-oﬀs between equality and eﬃciency. The purpose of this study is precisely to
study the eﬀect of various income maintenance schemes on poverty, inequality and
social welfare. Summary statistics for the underlying level of poverty and inequality
are computed. However, because the question we ask is essentially a qualitative
one, we also undertake an ordinal analysis of the income distributions pertaining to
the various policy scenarios, examining the underlying Lorenz and poverty deﬁcit
curves. The social welfare criterion embodies a preference for higher incomes, and
accordingly provides a means of comparing alternative policy scenarios which gen-
erate diﬀerent levels of aggregate income. Thus, income distributions pertaining to
key scenarios of interest are also compared in the light of the generalized Lorenz
criterion.
Taking a benchmark scenario, the current distribution of household disposable
income in Switzerland for individuals in paid employment, or seeking employment
and available for work, we are also interested in examining if any of the policy
scenarios we examine can result in a social welfare improvement over the reference
situation.1 The various schemes examined here include a full negative income tax
allowance, a partial negative income tax allowance, a participation income covering
50% of the subsistence cost of living, an income support scheme which tops up
household resources to the level of subsistence expenditure, and a simpliﬁed form of
an earned income tax credit.
As stated above, alternative income support schemes result in diﬀerent budget
1The self-employed are excluded from our analysis primarily because of poor data quality. See
the data appendix for further details.
2constraints for household. In this sense, it would be somewhat arbitrary to assume
that household labour supply remains ﬁxed across policy scenarios. For this reason,
our chosen method of investigation was to undertake a microsimulation study of
family labour supply responses, comprising an estimated econometric model coupled
with an integrated tax-beneﬁt module that models the budget constraint of every
household under diﬀerent policy scenarios. The microsimulation method has been
used to investigate the incentive eﬀects of welfare reform packages such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit in the US, and the Working Families Tax Credit in the United
Kingdom (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999 as well as Blundell, 2001 for discussions).
A similar study in the Swiss context is that of Gerﬁn and Leu (2003), where the
authors propose to examine also by means of a microsimulation technique the likely
eﬀects on poverty and labour force participation of the introduction of an earned
income tax credit.
It is important to note however that studies of this type (eg. Duncan and Giles
1996 and 1998) pay cursory attention to the overall distributional impact of tax
credit reforms, choosing to focus instead on labour supply responses (because such
schemes are primarily intended to stimulate participation). Our paper thus departs
from this literature by placing the emphasis of the analysis on changes in income
distribution.
Social security reform has been high on the agenda of most developed countries.
The American Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC], and the British Working Families
Tax Credit [WFTC], have been the subject of various evaluation studies (see Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999 for a survey). The rationale underlying these programmes is
to induce increased participation of low income workers in the labour force. The
Negative Income Tax [NIT] and Basic Income [BI], two related income support
schemes, are more predominantly intended to redistribute resources to the poor
population, independently of their work decisions.
The proposal for a NIT ﬁrst appeared in Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and
Freedom. Though it was never implemented, it has also shaped a great deal of
recent US welfare policy as argued for instance by Moﬃtt (2003). Friedman (1962)
intended to substitute the NIT for the ’rag bag’ of multiple welfare programmes.
This was argued to save administrative costs, and was also argued to be beneﬁcial
on the grounds that the NIT would ’integrate’ the tax system. The NIT would not
intrude into people’s privacy since other than a means test, welfare oﬃcers were not
required to evaluate individual’s capacity to work, how hard they have tried to ﬁnd
work etc. Because of the universal nature of this policy package, the NIT was also
3argued to reduce welfare stigma (an analysis of which is presented in Moﬃtt, 1983)
and not to interfere with marriage decisions and family composition.
The Basic Income and accompanying ﬂat tax proposal is extensively discussed
in Atkinson (1995). The basic income proposal shares many features with the NIT.
Under the BI proposal the tax rate on all income sources is intended to be identical,
obviating the need to deﬁne a tax unit. Thus, unlike in the NIT, the beneﬁt recipient
in the case of the BI is the individual and not the family. The tax rate on income
is intended to be ﬂat, in order to save on the administrative costs of operating a
graduated tax schedule. The linear income tax rate envisaged is perhaps in the
order of 0.4 to 0.5.
We devote a large part of our study to the examination of the eﬀect on income
distribution of the introduction of a combined negative income tax allowance and ﬂat
tax. The related basic income and ﬂat tax proposal has been the focus of the study
of Atkinson (1995). Our study is similar in emphasis to that of Creedy and Dawkins
(2002), which addresses several issues raised in Atkinson (1995) by comparing the
working of a means tested beneﬁt versus a universal coverage. Creedy and Dawkins
use a simulation method to address their concerns, whereas this study is based on a
micro-simulation technique with reference to Swiss household data. As is most often
the case, the particularities and level of realism underlying a microsimulation model
[MSM] are chosen to reﬂect the nature of the question one wishes to address. At one
end, one ﬁnds arithmetic MSMsdesigned primarily to study the impact of marginal
reforms on household welfare (see Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005 for a discussion)
which abstract from behavioral responses in the aftermath of policy reforms. At the
other end we ﬁnd the level of generality proposed by Fredriksen and Stolen (2007)
and Merz (1996), where events such as changes in family composition, the decision
to migrate, or mortality risk2 are taken into account.
We are primarily interested in labour supply reactions of households in face of
alternative tax and beneﬁt schemes. Thus, we follow Orsini (2006) and Steiner and
Wrolich (2006) in adopting the discrete choice hours of work framework initially
proposed by van Soest (1995) for modelling behavioral responses. It is to be noted
that labour demand is assumed inﬁnitely elastic in this approach. Because the tax
reforms we study have to be judged in relation to their distributional impact but
also in relation to their feasibility, it is important that the various policy reforms
we examine be comparable in terms of the costs they entail. For this reason we
have chosen to implement the various programmes under the requirement of ﬁscal
2See in particular the description of the Mosart MSM the authors of the study provide.
4neutrality, as in Aaberge, Colombino and Strom (2004).
It is plausible in practice that given two households with identical characteris-
tics and occupational choices, they respond diﬀerently to a change in the tax/beneﬁt
system which concerns them equally. This is the problem of unobserved heterogene-
ity in relation to labour supply responses (see Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005). To
accommodate this source of unobserved heterogeneity, we simulate (as in Gerﬁn and
Leu 2003) a pseudo-residual for each household, chosen so as to make the predicted
occupational choice of the household conform with its utility maximizing choice
under the benchmark scenario.
Perhaps one feature of our study which sets it apart from the papers mentioned
above, is our emphasis on the ordinal analysis of the eﬀect of policy reform on
income distribution. Again, our interest in poverty and inequality reduction and not
in changes in work hours per se, has geared our analysis towards these normative
aspects of policy reform.
In this sense, it is hoped that the present study presents a step in the direction
of adding realism to the evaluation of the redistributive impact of various income
maintenance schemes.
Section 2 of the paper presents the policy scenarios which form the basis of our
study. Results are presented in section 3 and 4. Section 5 contains a detailed exam-
ination of the unique policy scenario which entails a general welfare improvement
over the current situation in Switzerland. Section 6 concludes the paper. A technical
appendix contains the details of our policy evaluation methods and a data appendix
presents the sample used in the study.
2 Policy scenarios
The tax reform scenarios we have chosen to simulate are intended to capture some
features of the diﬀerent schemes discussed above, and of the current situation in
Switzerland. However because of the federal structure of ﬁscality in Switzerland,
they are considerably simpliﬁed in order to be easily implemented in the context
of our study. All in all we have considered eight scenarios, a benchmark scenario,
w h i c hw eh a v et e r m e dbase in Table 1, together with six other schemes. We begin
with a summary of the general structure of the Swiss tax and beneﬁt system.
Income taxes are levied at three diﬀerent levels in Switzerland: federal, cantonal
and municipal. There are diﬀerent tax schedules that operate for each Canton and
there is also a distinct federal income tax schedule. In general, each Canton chooses
5to operate a separate schedule for each of the main two demographic groups: singles
and married couples. This is also the case with regards to the federal income tax.
Municipal taxes are set as a proportion of cantonal taxes. Note that the cantonal
tax schedules vary a great deal in terms of progressivity. Every Canton will also
allow for some tax deductions, in relation to the number of dependent children and
also in relation to social insurance and pension funds contributions. Again these tax
deduction rules are fairly heterogeneous across Cantons.
Social insurance contributions operate at both the federal and cantonal level.
Two major federal level payroll deductions are unemployment insurance (approxi-
mately 1% of gross earnings) and old age insurance (AVS)–the ﬁrst tier of pension
contributions amounting to about 5.25% of gross earnings. The second tier of the
retirement pension scheme is operated by private pension funds subject to a legal
minimum levying rate. Similarly, social beneﬁts are administered by both federal
and cantonal authorities. Unemployment beneﬁts are determined at the federal
level. Individuals who have contributed for a six months period are entitled to 70%
to 80% of their gross earnings over a 24 months period. The take-up of a basic
health insurance scheme is compulsory. Government regulated private insurance
providers insure individuals. The actual insurance premiums are not determined by
the individual’s income or wealth, but rather according to their age group. Cantons
however provide rebates to households with limited means. Health insurance rebates
as well as housing and child beneﬁts are administered by the Cantons. The rules
as to who qualiﬁes for these cantonal beneﬁts, the means test, and the level of the
transfer are all subject to the Canton’s discretion.
However, the guidelines of the Swiss Conference on Social Support (CSIAS)
regarding the minimum subsistence income are generally followed by the relevant
cantonal authorities. For this same reason, in applied work on Switzerland, the
equivalence scale and related income thresholds used to deﬁne the poverty line are
those of the CSIAS. The CSIAS sets the critical income threshold at CHF 23690 per
equivalent adult. This stands in contrast with other commonly used thresholds in
the European Union, determined as a given fraction of median disposable income.
We note however that this threshold corresponds to 57% of the median equivalent
household disposable income in 1998, when needs are calculated using the modiﬁed
OECD scale.
It is important to note that our benchmark scenario diﬀers from the current
situation in Switzerland in one important respect. All cantons operate diﬀerent
types of social assistance schemes subject to means tests. Amongst the population
6entitled for social assistance, the take up of these allowances is however far from the
rule. Leu et al. (1997) in fact suggest that the non-take up rate varies considerably
according to the type of beneﬁt considered, and is somewhere in the range of 45%
to 86%.
Ideally we would have wanted to model the probability of beneﬁt take-up. How-
ever, because of data limitations, we were unable to estimate such a decision. For
this reason, we assume in our base scenario however that no one receives social
beneﬁts from the government. The current situation in Switzerland with regards
to social assistance is therefore somewhere between our base scenario and another
limiting case where the take-up rate is universal, a scenario which we have modelled
below under the label inc supp. The diﬀerent scenarios are summarized with the
help of Table 1, and Figures 1 and 2 according to the participation condition they
entail (essentially a restriction on work hours) and the underlying budget constraint
(summarized by the column headings income subsidy and ﬂat tax region). The sce-
narios are all constructed to be revenue neutral, meaning that they generate the
same level of tax receipts at the federal level as in the benchmark scenario, plus the
revenues required to sustain the alternative income support programmes.
Participation in a scenario located in the north half of Figure 1 is subject to an
income means test. Participation in a scenario located in the east half is subject to
a minimum number of hours restriction. Thus, eitc100, located in the North-East
quadrant operates subject to both an hours of work requirement and an income
restriction. In the South-West quadrant, we have the other polar case deﬁning
policy scenarios which have a universal character (that do not require labour force
participation, and which are not restricted to individuals on low income.) There
are two policy reforms of this nature which we shall examine below: nit50f and
nit100f which are two variants of the negative income tax. The scenario inc supp
(an income support scheme) located in the North-West quadrant grants assistance
to families on low income, regardless of their employment status. Conversely, pi50f
in the South-East quadrant, is a participation income which is granted to all families
that meet an hours of work requirement, irrespective of their income levels. The
pros and cons of each of the scenarios from the point of view of the equity and
eﬃciency eﬀects they entail will be discussed later, with the results at hand.
We ﬁrst consider the scenario ﬂat taxf, intended to examine the redistributive
eﬀect of replacing the current federal, cantonal and municipal income tax structure
by a single ﬂat tax, operating as of the level of subsistence expenditure.3 There are
3The ”f” of the acronym ”ﬂat taxf” denotes the fact that a single tax would be levied at the
7two reasons which motivate this exercise. First, as argued by Atkinson (1995, p. 2)
in the context of Britain, the tax rate required to sustain variants of the Negative
Income Tax is likely to be higher than the current highest tax rates operating in
Europe, so that the scope for a non-linear graduated tax schedule is indeed limited.
Second, the feasibility of the envisaged tax reforms can be summarized by examining
the marginal tax rate necessary to sustain the reforms under a balanced budget
requirement. We also consider a variant of the above scenario, ﬂat tax,w h e r ew e
only replace the current federal income tax structure by a single ﬂat tax, operating
as of the level of subsistence expenditure. This latter scenario will prove useful for
assessing the desirability of reforms more limited in nature than the negative income
tax, i.e. inc supp and eitc100.
Consider then the scenario nit50f in Table 2. This scenario grants households
50% of subsistence expenditure, but only begins to tax income as of the level of
subsistence expenditure. As there are no participation conditions operating here,
the scenario is intended to capture the distributive eﬀects of what may be considered
to be a negative income tax allowance covering 50% of household subsistence costs
(as opposed to a full negative income tax scheme granting an allowance equal to
100% of subsistence expenditure). As is the case in ﬂat taxf, under the scenario
nit50f households are assumed to pay all their taxes at the federal level. Therefore,
the graduated cantonal and federal income tax schemes are replaced by a unique
linear income tax schedule, which is sketched in Figure 2. We also examine the
impact of a full negative income tax scheme which we have called nit100f.T h e
scheme therefore grants an income allowance covering subsistence expenditure. The
nit100f scheme is the full negative income tax analogue of nit50f,w h i c hi sa l s o
sketched in Figure 2.4
Another variant of the negative income tax package is one where a participation
requirement is introduced. The participation income scheme considered here intro-
duces a work requirement on behalf of each adult in the household. For example,
under pi50f the participation income is not paid to a two-parent family in case the
wife decides to stay home to take care of the children, even when the family’s re-
sources fall short of a speciﬁed poverty line. Likewise, for single parent households
such as lone mothers, the scheme only covers those in paid employment. The scheme
pi50f therefore mimics all features of nit50f with the participation condition added.
federal level, replacing the three-level structure of the current Swiss income tax system. We use
this notation for other scenarios which include such a wide-ranging ﬁscal reform.
4For the two variants of the negative income tax, namely nit100f and nit50f, we take it that
basic health insurance is ﬁnanced through income taxation.
8Finally, we have considered simulating two further social assistance packages
which involve a federal tax only, keeping cantonal and municipal taxation unchanged.
We have deﬁned an income support package, inc supp, which tops up the income
of every household to bring them to the level of subsistence expenditure. Until
this threshold is reached, there is a one for one withdrawal of assistance for each
additional franc earned, implying a marginal tax rate of 100%; a scheme in many
respects identical to the way social assistance operates currently in a majority of
Swiss cantons.5 Once the subsistence threshold is crossed, we assume that federal
taxation takes the form of the linear ﬂat tax scheme ﬂat taxf discussed earlier.
Our ﬁnal policy package operates as inc supp with the additional participation
requirement of positive work hours for each household member. Because this last
package is in several ways similar to the American and British tax credit schemes
discussed in the Introduction, we have chosen to label this last scenario eitc100.
3 Results: an overview
In order to evaluate the economic eﬀects of the scenarios outlined in the preceding
section, we use a microsimulation model which combines a tax-beneﬁt module and an
econometrically estimated model of labour supply. The tax-beneﬁt module contains
detailed tax and beneﬁt schedules for Swiss residents both at the federal and cantonal
level. These schedules are used, on the one hand, to generate budget constraints
for each household in the econometric estimations and, on the other hand, as a
baseline for the simulation of alternative policy scenarios. In the econometric model,
labour supply is modelled as a discrete choice between non participation and diﬀerent
employment states (part-time,...,full-time). The labour supply model is speciﬁed
separately for two-adult and single-adult households, using the Swiss expenditure
and income survey of 1998 as data base. Our sample includes 5434 family units.6
The eﬀects on income distribution, output and employment entailed by the eight
scenarios discussed above are summarized in Table 2. There are two sets of results:
Panel A results refer to reforms involving an integrated tax system replacing the
existing three levels of taxation. Panel B results pertain to reforms involving a
5A 100% marginal tax rate describes quite precisely the social assistance system in 1998 when
the ERC survey was carried out. More recently, several cantons have introduced a small incentive
to take up work by exonerating the ﬁrst several hundred francs earned per month. However, these
modest reforms have worsened the situation of those who plan to leave the social assistance system
altogether; in this situation marginal tax rates well above 100% can be observed in several cantons.
These more complicated schemes could not be taken into account in our simulations since data
limitations prevented us from modelling the take-up decision, as mentioned above.
6See the Appendix for a detailed description of the microsimulation framework.
9change in federal taxation only. For each scenario we report inequality statistics
(Atkinson and Gini indices) and poverty statistics (head-count and Foster et al. Pα
indices). We also report for the various scenarios the relative variation in average
disposable income and in total hours of work. We also present the value for the
ﬂat tax rate t required to sustain the various social insurance schemes under the
assumption of revenue neutrality discussed above. Before we turn to the results, we
give brief remarks pertaining to the choice of indices of income distribution.
3.1 A note on the choice of inequality and poverty indices
The Gini coeﬃcient is presented here due to its wide appeal amongst practitioners
and government statistical bureaus. While the Gini index satisﬁes the Pigou-Dalton
principle of social aversion to inequality, this index presents a drawback in the sense
that the underlying social welfare function is quasi-concave, but not strictly so. For
this reason the social marginal utility of income to a household underlying the Gini
index depends only on its rank, rather than the level of its resources. In practice, the
Gini index will be more sensitive to income changes in the middle of the distribution
rather than in the tails. The Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) does not present this
drawback of the Gini. Furthermore, in case sub-group decomposable measures of
inequality are required, the Atkinson index can be used, whereas the Gini index is
not decomposable.
The poverty headcount is a useful summary statistic indicating the population
share living below the poverty line. However it conveys no information about the
depth of the problem, and it is insensitive to the distribution of resources among the
poor. For this reason, we supplement the head-count with the Foster et al. (1984)
measure Pα, which oﬀers a remedy for both problems for values of α>1.
3.2 Policy eﬀects: summary statistics
Our summary statistics here pertain to the resulting distributions of household dis-
posable income. The income concept used is the equivalized household income;
needs being calculated according to the CSIAS equivalence scale discussed above.7
Our benchmark scenario base entails a level of inequality of 0.15 when using the
7In the calculation of summary statistics, the household data are weighed according to sample
weights provided by the ERC survey.
10Atkinson index and 0.21 using the Gini coeﬃcient.8,9 The poverty headcount H
takes on a value of 0.033 while the Pα index takes on a value of 0.002. To examine
the eﬀect of replacing all taxation with a ﬂat tax rate, other things held constant,
we examine the ﬂat taxf scenario. The results (ﬁrst line of Panel A) indicate that
the introduction of an integrated ﬂat tax would result in a marginal tax rate of
28.69%. There is a marginal increase in inequality, with a 1% decline in the poverty
headcount.10 There is a 0.14% increase in average disposable income, and virtually
no change in total hours worked.
Next, we turn to nit50f, the partial negative income tax allowance. In comparison
to the introduction of a ﬂat tax scheme alone, the combined partial negative income
tax allowance and ﬂat tax has a pronounced eﬀect on income inequality and poverty.
Taking nit50f, we may note a 44% drop in the level of the IA index, in comparison
to the benchmark scenario base. There is also a 24% drop associated with the Gini
(a decline from 0.21 to 0.16). The resulting poverty head-count drops from 3.3% to
1.1%. Likewise, for the Pα index there is also a substantial 50% drop from 0.002
to 0.001. The envisaged scenario is shown however to entail a heavy tax burden:
in comparison to the 28.7% marginal tax rate of ﬂat taxf, households above the
subsistence resource level would face a federal marginal tax rate of 51% under nit50f.
The welfare gains from increased equality have therefore to be weighted against
the eﬃciency eﬀects they entail: our microsimulation results indicate a resulting
5.9% reduction in disposable income and a 6.4% decline in total hours worked in
comparison to the base scenario.
Next consider the full negative income tax allowance, nit100f.O f t h e e i g h t
schemes considered here nit100f allows for the largest drop in inequality. The Atkin-
son index takes a value of 0.06, and the Gini 0.14. In its current form, the proposed
scheme is excessively costly to operate: the federal tax rate required to sustain
nit100f is equal to 0.62. Again, the equality gains resulting from the above social
insurance scheme have to be weighed against their eﬃciency costs: nit100f entails
a 9.3% reduction in disposable income and 10% reduction in work hours. It is also
instructive to compare the full negative income tax scheme with its partial negative
income tax allowance counterpart: nit100f entails an integrated marginal tax rate of
8The calculations pertaining to poverty and inequality have been undertaken using the software
DAD 4.4 (see Duclos et al., 2005).
9The calculations for the Atkinson index here set the inequality aversion parameter ε at 2; for
the calculations of the Foster et al. index we set α at 2.
10This decline in poverty results from the fact that in the base scenario the poor are not exempted
from taxation in all cantons. Under the present scenario all incomes below the poverty line are
exempt from taxation.
110.62 whereas nit50f was sustainable at t =0 .51. While nit50f does not eliminate all
poverty, it results in a limited 5.9% sacriﬁce in terms of average disposable income,
whereas, as stated earlier, nit100f entails a 9.3% loss of average income.
The next scenario we examine operates under a participation requirement for
all working age adults. This participation income scheme is not intended to reduce
social exclusion — it typically excludes non-participants in the labour market. In-
stead, its purpose is to induce participation. The pi50f scheme is the analogue of
nit50f, with the participation condition added. It is therefore instructive to compare
the performances of pi50f and nit50f in equity and eﬃciency terms. While nit50f
entails a 6.4% reduction of work hours, there is a 0.6% increase of hours under the
latter scheme. Our microsimulation results suggest that pi50f is sustainable at an
integrated ﬂat tax rate of 0.42, whereas t was found to equal 0.51 under nit50f.T h e
variant with a participation requirement however entails degrees of inequality not
far from those of the benchmark scenario base. The Gini for instance equals 0.19
under pi50f, 0.21 under base, but is considerably lower, 0.16, under nit50f.I ti st o
be noted also that pi50f does not reduce the poverty headcount to the level achieved
by the nit50f reform.
Under Panel B we examine more limited reforms involving a change in federal
taxation only. The analogue of ﬂat taxf is a scenario ﬂat tax which replaces the
existing federal income tax schedule (a tax schedule involving a large interval of
exemption followed by a steeply rising average tax rate) with a ﬂat tax levied as
of subsistence expenditure. The existing cantonal and municipal taxes however
remain unchanged. The resulting marginal tax rate of 4.9% (ﬁrst line of Panel B)
highlights the limited nature of the reform involved. There inequality rises because
with a marginal tax rate of 4.9% the resulting tax schedule is less progressive than
the federal tax schedule of the base scenario. The level of poverty is virtually
unchanged. There is a 0.16% increase in average disposable income, and a 0.4%
increase in hours worked.
Our inc supp scenario is designed with the speciﬁc purpose of eliminating poverty
by targeting resources exclusively to those below the subsistence poverty line, and
by granting poor families only the top up required to reach the subsistence level. It
comes therefore with little surprise that such a ﬁnely targeted scheme achieve the
0% poverty level at a federal tax rate of only 9.1%. We devote a sub-section below
to a critical examination of the relative merits of operating such a scheme.
The ﬁnal scheme we considered is a variant of the above scheme designed to
correct for the disincentive eﬀects related to inc supp. The earlier scheme is thus
12kept in all respects unchanged, except now that every working age adult is required
to supply a positive amount of hours in order for the household to beneﬁt from
social assistance. The resulting scheme eitc100, is operational with a linear tax
rate of 6.7%, and results in a minor (0.03%) decline in hours worked.11 Again,
the incentive eﬀects induced by such a scheme have to be judged in the light of
its less successful performance in terms of income redistribution. Our summary
measures indicate that the eitc100 scheme results in an increase of inequality over
the benchmark scenario, and entails higher levels of poverty than all other reform
scenarios. Again, the main reason for this ﬁnding is due to the fact that the resulting
federal income tax scheme, with a marginal tax rate of 6.7% is considerably less
progressive than that of the base scenario.
3.3 Policy eﬀects: a word of caution
It is to be noted that many of the critiques voiced against the targeting approach
(for instance Sen, 1995) apply in the context of the operation of the inc supp scheme:
namely it is assumed that household resources are observed accurately, that there is
no stigma to applying for assistance, no administrative costs to evaluating household
resources and ﬁnally that targeting type I and II errors are inexistent (see Goodin,
1985 for a discussion).
The results of Table 2 may easily lead the policy maker to conclude that the
income support scheme is most preferable given that it eliminates poverty with
a moderate 9% ﬂat tax scheme, and a 2.4% loss in average disposable income.
However, bearing in mind that at the chosen level of the poverty line very few people
with very uncommon circumstances are in poverty, a word of caution is required here.
In Figure 3, we plot the poverty headcount against the poverty line for various policy
scenarios. One pattern clearly emerges when comparing the overall performances of
the four scenarios examined there: the inc supp scheme clearly eliminates poverty
up to the retained level of subsistence expenditure. However, the poverty headcount
immediately jumps to well over 5% (a higher level than in all other scenarios) for
poverty lines above the pre-speciﬁed income threshold. The reason for this ﬁnding is
the well documented poverty trap induced by an income support scheme operating
a 100% marginal tax rate on all income earned below the subsistence poverty line,
11Although the participation condition of the eitc100 scheme encourages individuals outside the
labour force to take up work, this reform provides also an incentive for working individuals (espe-
cially secondary earners) to reduce the number of hours worked. Here the latter eﬀect obviously
prevails over the former.
13leading many households to stop working altogether.12
This somewhat undesirable feature of inc supp occurs to a lesser extent in the
context of eitc100. The latter scheme does not eliminate poverty entirely at the
level of subsistence expenditure; however the jump in the poverty headcount which
occurs above the speciﬁed poverty threshold is smaller in size than is the case in the
context of the earlier scheme. The negative income tax scheme nit50f while costly
to administer however entails a lower level of head-count poverty than the base
scenario, eitc100,a n dinc supp once we consider poverty lines above the retained
subsistence expenditure level. It is in this sense necessary to examine the overall
distributive impact of the various policy scenarios, not just around a pre-speciﬁed
poverty line. We turn to such considerations in the section below.
The analysis of inequality also yields intriguing results. Moving from the bench-
mark scenario to inc supp, the Atkinson inequality index of Table 2 indicates a
decline, whereas the Gini index records a rise, in the level of inequality. This re-
sult is best apprehended by recalling that, on the one hand, inc supp redistributes
resources to those at the bottom end of the distribution and, on the other hand, a
substantial share of households in the middle of the distribution see their income
decrease because they cease to work. The Atkinson index is more sensitive to the
former eﬀect and the Gini index to the latter. These results demonstrate the im-
portance of a more general approach to income inequality comparisons. This is the
issue of the next section.
4 Changes in income distribution: an ordinal analysis
The various scenarios analyzed above were shown to redistribute income and to
alleviate poverty to diﬀering extents. They were also shown to have diﬀerent impacts
on hours worked and average income.13
It is necessary however to complement the results of Table 2 by taking a further
look at the data. Questions such as what happens to income inequality if we choose
to use an alternative inequality index to the Gini and Atkinson measure need to be
addressed. Similarly, depending on the budget constraints they entail, the various
12The participation rate of single adult households drops from 90.6% in the base scenario to
83.1% in inc supp. Moreover, the share of couples who work zero hours increases from 0.7% in the
base scenario to 1.7% in the inc supp scenario.
13Clearly, the welfare loss resulting from a reduction in average income and in hours worked under
certain scenarios may be partly oﬀset from the welfare gains arising from additional consumption
of leisure. Our primary interest here being on the changes in poverty and inequality, we do not take
up this issue further. Regarding this point see Aaberge et al. (2004) and Kornstad and Thoresen
(2006) for further details.
14policies may redistribute resources diﬀerently at the bottom, middle and top of the
income ladder. In this respect, the use of graphical devices involving transformations
of the cumulative distribution function will usually provide richer information on the
extent of redistribution, than an examination of poverty and inequality summary
measures.
To address these issues, in this section we examine the distributional impact
of the set of policy scenarios from an ordinal perspective.14 That is, taking one
pair of distributions at a time, we examine the usual dominance conditions on the
respective Lorenz curves pertaining to these scenarios which guarantee a change in
inequality of the same sign for all inequality indices that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle (subsection 4.1). Likewise for the class of poverty indices which
obey the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, we examine related dominance conditions
on the pattern of speciﬁc pairs of poverty deﬁcit curves which guarantee that all
poverty measures rank two speciﬁc scenarios in a similar fashion (subsection 4.2).
The ﬁnal subsection addresses the question as to which of the ﬁve envisaged reform
scenarios may be seen to entail a level of social welfare superior to the current status
quo scenario in Switzerland. Following Shorrocks (1983), the social welfare concept
may be seen here as an approach unifying considerations of equity and eﬃciency.
4.1 Income inequality
The Lorenz curve is typically used to depict information on income inequality, but
also, to check for inequality orderings. When the Lorenz curve for a distribution
FA lies everywhere above that of FB, then all inequality indices that exhibit a so-
cial aversion to inequality will rank FA as the more equal distribution. Table 3
summarizes the information regarding the 15 pair-wise comparisons between the
six scenarios mentioned above. If the Lorenz curve for FA lies everywhere above
that of FB, then this information can be conveyed by plotting the diﬀerence be-
tween the Lorenz curves of these two distributions. The resulting curve should have
an inverted U shape. Figure 4 presents such plots for diﬀerences in Lorenz curves
between selected scenarios.
The ﬁrst line of Table 3 contains comparisons between the benchmark scenario
base and the other retained scenarios. The cell (base, nit100f) has a + sign, signify-
ing that the benchmark scenario exhibits more inequality than nit100f in a Lorenz
dominance sense. The cell (base, inc supp) conveys the information (+, p=1) indi-
cating that the underlying Lorenz curves cross at the ﬁrst income decile, with the
14In what follows, the scenarios ﬂat tax and ﬂat taxf are dropped from the analysis.
15Lorenz curve of the benchmark scenario lying below prior to the intersection, and
above from the second to ninth decile. As the inc supp programme is targeted to
top up the resources of families living below the poverty line, this result is indeed
expected. With crossing Lorenz curves, a summary measure which is suﬃciently
sensitive to inequality at the bottom of the distribution, may rank inc supp as the
more egalitarian of the two scenarios. This is why the Atkinson index indicates that
inc supp is more favourable than the benchmark scenario from the perspective of
income inequality. There is a similar crossing of Lorenz curves between the bench-
mark scenario and eitc100, even though the latter does not provide the income top
up to families where both adults do not work. The next two cells indicate that
the benchmark scenario exhibits more inequality than both variants of the partial
negative income tax allowance retained, namely nit50f and pi50f. In this sense, our
results show an unambiguous eﬀect of inequality reduction when operating a full
NIT allowance, a partial NIT allowance or a (partial) participation income.
It is not without interest to compare also the scope for redistribution between
the various policy scenarios. The second line of Table 3 indicates that the Lorenz
curve of nit100f lies everywhere above that of the other ﬁve scenarios examined in
this section. The cost of operating such a scheme (a ﬂat tax rate of 0.62 and a
9.3% loss of average disposable income) may be evaluated in the light of the gains
in income redistribution. Figure 4 plots Lorenz curve diﬀerences between nit100f
and base, and between nit100f and each of inc supp, eitc100, nit50f and pi50f.I t
is to be noted that all curves have the inverted U shape discussed earlier, with the
extent of redistribution being more pronounced when moving from a partial NIT
allowance nit50f to a full NIT allowance. The reductions in income inequality in
moving from either the benchmark scenario, inc-supp or eitc100 to the negative
income tax allowance are however substantial. As is most often the case, the extent
of redistribution is usually largest for the middle income groups (see for instance
Davidson and Duclos, 1997). Consider for instance the transition from the base
scenario to nit100f. There, at the ﬁfth decile, there is a redistribution of 6% of total
income from the richer to poorer groups.
The third to sixth lines of Table 3 compare the remaining policy scenarios. It may
be noted that the participation requirement introduced in eitc100 makes this sce-
nario less egalitarian than inc supp for the bottom income decile. The distribution
entailed by the partial NIT allowance nit50f Lorenz dominates all other distribu-
tions with the exception of the distribution related to the full NIT allowance. The
distribution resulting from the operation of the participation income is Lorenz dom-
16inated by the distributions pertaining to nit100f and nit50f, as discussed earlier.
However pi50f Lorenz dominates eitc100. As a consequence of the participation
requirement, the Lorenz curve pertaining to pi50f lies below that of inc supp up to
the 4th percentile (p =0 .6); the inequality ranking of these two distributions will
therefore not be robust to the choice of inequality index.
4.2 Poverty
The poverty headcount in our sample takes a value of 0.033 under the base scenario.
This ﬁgure is low because on one hand there is comparatively less poverty in Switzer-
land than in other European countries, but also because our sample excludes the
elderly and self-employed populations. As such, it would be somewhat misleading to
judge the overall performance of our various policy scenarios in the light of one single
poverty line which identiﬁes very few cases as being in a state of deprivation. We
check therefore for potential crossings of poverty deﬁcit curves (the ﬁrst cumulant
of the cumulative distribution function), where we consider all poverty lines ranging
from zero to 50’000 Swiss francs (i.e. 210% of the CSIAS poverty threshold). When
the poverty deﬁcit curve for a distribution FA lies everywhere in this income domain
below that of FB, then all poverty indices that exhibit a social aversion to inequality
will rank FA as the socially preferred distribution, within the range of poverty lines
under consideration.
Table 4 reports the ﬁfteen pair-wise scenario comparisons from an ordinal poverty
perspective. The ﬁrst line of Table 4 indicates that the distribution of the base
scenario entails more poverty than the distributions pertaining to the two variants
of the NIT allowance. It also comes out clearly from the second line of Table 4,
and Figure 5, that the full NIT allowance nit100f outperforms all other income
schemes in reducing poverty. Note also that the deﬁcit curve of the partial NIT
allowance scheme lies in the income range of interest everywhere below the deﬁcit
curves pertaining to base, eitc100 and pi50f.
It is also clear that inc supp will eliminate poverty up to the threshold (here
CHF 23690) where the income top up ceases to operate. However, the incentive
eﬀects of such a scheme are such that its deﬁcit curve cuts from below the deﬁcit
curve of the base scenario at CHF 27550. Its deﬁcit curve intersects the deﬁcit curve
of eitc100 at CHF 26740, that of nit50f at CHF 24870 and that of pi50f at CHF
25440. As discussed in subsection 3.3, once we vary the level of the poverty line,
there is therefore scope for ranking inc supp and other scenarios (with the exception
of nit100f ) diﬀerently depending on the choice of distributionally sensitive poverty
17measures.
Of related interest is the performance of the participation income in relation to
inc supp and eitc100 in reducing poverty. For all poverty lines considered here, the
deﬁcit curve pertaining to pi50f lies below that of eitc100. Both schemes require
participation in the labour market in order to qualify for social assistance, while inc
supp does not. This partly explains why the deﬁcit curve of pi50f cuts that of inc
supp from above.
4.3 Social welfare
This ﬁnal sub-section attempts to synthesize the previous ﬁndings by asking the
question as to which scenarios present a social welfare improvement over the current
situation in Switzerland. We have seen that the full NIT allowance scheme nit100f
while eliminating poverty and bringing inequality to its lowest level in the ﬁndings
of Table 2, entails an important cost in terms of income loss (a 9.3% reduction
of average disposable income). The question regarding the social welfare test is
therefore important to address, especially in the face of general scepticism about
the feasibility of NIT allowance and ﬂat tax proposals.
In order to weigh the gains from redistribution against eﬃciency losses, it is
useful to summarize distributions by means of social welfare functions which satisfy
a social aversion to inequality axiom (Pigou-Dalton transfer principle), and one of
preference for higher incomes. Akin to the Lorenz curve, the generalized Lorenz
curve is typically used to test for social welfare orderings: when the generalized
Lorenz curve for a distribution FA lies everywhere above that of FB, then all social
welfare indices that exhibit a social aversion to inequality and a preference for higher
incomes will rank FA as the more equal distribution. As shown by Shorrocks (1983),
it is also the case that the generalized Lorenz criterion is biased toward eﬃciency
preference: FA cannot dominate FB if the mean of the former distribution is lower
than that of the latter.
An examination of the ﬁfth column of results in Table 2 is particularly infor-
mative in this sense, since it shows that with the exception of the participation
income pi50f all policy reform scenarios considered in this Section entail losses of
total income in comparison to the benchmark scenario. It is nonetheless useful to
examine the social welfare eﬀects of the various schemes considered in this section
even though it is clear now that the only likely candidate for passing the social
welfare test is pi50f.
If the generalized Lorenz curve for FA lies everywhere above that of FB, up to,
18say the qth income decile, then this information can be conveyed by plotting the
diﬀerence between the generalized Lorenz curves of these two distributions. The
resulting curve should initially lie in the positive domain of the vertical axis, should
cut the origin at the qth decile, and from then on should lie in the negative domain
of the vertical axis. Such a graph would also indicate that the social welfare of
families belonging to the bottom q income deciles is higher in F A over F B.F i g u r e s
6 and 7 provide such plots of vertical diﬀerences in generalized Lorenz curves, of the
type GLC(base;q) − GLC(j,q), where j is the vector of incomes pertaining to one
of the remaining ﬁve scenarios.
In Figure 6 we provide plots for two comparisons, between the base scenario,
and each of inc supp and eitc100. Both curves are initially below zero. The curve
GLC(base; q)−GLC(inc supp; q) crosses the zero horizontal line half way between
the ﬁfth and tenth percentiles. The curve GLC(base; q)−GLC(eitc100; q) is however
closer to the zero horizontal line up to the fourteenth income percentile. These
ﬁndings may readily be seen as conﬁrming the results previously reported in Table 4.
There, we had reported (i)t h a tinc supp dominates base for all poverty lines ranging
from zero to CHF 27550, and that (ii)t h eeitc100 deﬁcit curve cuts that of base
a ﬁrst time from below at CHF 6260, from above at CHF 12760, and a ﬁnal time,
from below, at CHF 31930.15 The welfare improvements obtained from these income
maintenance schemes therefore essentially accrue to the bottom groups, but not to
the entire population.
Figure 7 contains remaining plots when the benchmark scenario is compared to
the full NIT allowance, the partial NIT allowance and the participation income. For
the bottom 65% of the population, nit100f and nit50f entail welfare improvements
over base. The heavy tax burdens entailed by these two schemes, and the resulting
eﬀect on work hours contribute to the negative ﬁnding with respect to the overall
level of social welfare. The participation income on the other hand, while not achiev-
ing the same level of eﬀectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality does not result
in losses of average disposable income. The remaining graph of Figure 7 lies in the
negative orthant of the vertical axis, indicating that the income distribution per-
taining to the participation income pi50f social welfare dominates the benchmark
scenario.
15It is to be noted that in the sample there are only two households with incomes below CHF
6260 and an additional thirteen with incomes short of CHF 12760.
195 Participation income reexamined
We have seen in the above section that, out of all reform scenarios considered in the
study, pi50f was the only reform leading to a social welfare improvement over the
base scenario. In order to understand this ﬁnding, it is instructive to examine how
households respond to the participation condition underlying the policy scenario
pi50f. To do so, we plot in Figures 8 and 9 the changes in tax burdens underlying
respectively the nit50f and pi50f schemes. The horizontal axis reports the dispos-
able income of the base scenario, while the vertical axis measures the diﬀerence in
tax payments in moving from the base scenario to nit50f (Figure 8), and the change
in tax burdens in moving from base to pi50f (Figure 9). Positive values along the
vertical axis indicate that a household pays more tax under a given scheme than in
t h eb a s es c e n a r i o .
A comparison of Figures 8 and 9 highlights several phenomena. First, a positive
slope of the data scatter indicates that the tax-beneﬁt scheme in the reform scenario
is globally more progressive than in the base scenario. The steeper slope of the data
underlying nit50f conﬁrms our earlier conclusion that this scenario is more redis-
tributive than pi50f. Second, the data of Figure 9 are more compactly distributed
along the middle horizontal line (the locus of zero change in tax burdens). There
are two main clusters in the data generated by the pi50f scenario. The upper left
cluster pertains to households who fail to qualify for the income allowance. Third,
the data points are more spread out below the main cluster in Figure 8, whereas
they are more evenly distributed, below and above the two main clusters, in Figure
9. As hourly wages are held ﬁxed across scenarios, this is indicative of diﬀerent
labour supply responses in the two scenarios, an issue to which we turn now.
Figure 10 depicts histograms of the change in labour supply by households,
measured in terms of yearly hours worked by household members. Although most
households do not change their work behaviour when the reforms are introduced
(zero hours changes are not plotted in the histograms), there is a striking diﬀerence
between the two scenarios with respect to the behaviour of those who adjust their
labour supply. Whereas households almost exclusively reduce their hours of work
in the nit50f scenario, the histogram of the hours changes in the pi50f scenario is
roughly symmetric around zero. The latter result indicates that there is a consid-
erable amount of heterogeneity in individual behaviour which underlies the small
variation in aggregate labour supply.
Additional insight can be obtained from the variation in participation rates and
hours choices, as shown in Table 5. Two results stand out. First, the participation
20requirement has a powerful eﬀect on the participation rate. If the beneﬁt is paid
unconditionally, as in scenario nit50f, some individuals tend to reduce their partic-
ipation in the labour market. This eﬀect is particularly pronounced for secondary
earners in couples: female workers reduce their participation rates from 62.5% (base)
to 56.8% (nit50f ). The participation condition of scenario pi50f more than compen-
sates for this disincentive to work: female workers increase their participation rate to
over 70%. The conditionality of the beneﬁt also prevents a fall in the participation
rate of single-adult households.
Second, individuals who hold a full-time job in the base case tend to reduce their
hours of work in the nit50f and pi50f scenarios. This eﬀect, which is linked to the
increase in the marginal tax rate, is again particulary strong for secondary earners.
Women who worked full-time in the base scenario reduce on average their weekly
amount of work by 3.2 hours under the pi50f scenario (see Table 5). The higher
marginal tax rate in the nit50f scenario (51% compared to 42% in pi50f )l e a d st o
an even stronger reduction in weekly work hours of full-time female workers, by 9.4
hours on average.
To sum up, the increase in the participation rate compensates for the reduction
in work hours of full-time workers in scenario pi50f. As a result, aggregate labour
supply and average disposable income increase slightly despite the more progressive
tax system. By contrast, the reduction in work hours in the nit50f scenario involves
a feedback eﬀect between labour supply and the balanced government budget: a
reduction in labour supply yields a fall in income tax revenues, compelling the
government to increase the ﬂat tax rate. This, in turn, leads to a further reduction
in labour supply. This adjustment process ﬁnally settles to a 6.4% drop in average
disposable income.
Finally, it is interesting to analyze the role of the participation conditionality
with respect to poverty. As discussed above, the pi50f reform does not reduce the
poverty headcount to the level achieved by the nit50f scheme primarily because
those who do not participate in the labor market are not entitled to beneﬁts under
the former scheme. There is, however, another important diﬀerence between the two
policies which becomes apparent by comparing the transitions in and out of poverty
these two scenarios entail, starting from the base scenario. These transition matrices
are reported in Table 6. They show that, although the nit50f reform lifts a greater
proportion of population out of poverty than pi50f, there is also a greater share of
households whose disposable income now falls below the poverty line (almost 1% of
population at the CSIAS poverty line). Under the pi50f scenario, the participation
21requirement largely prevents this movement into poverty.
6 Concluding comments
The purpose of this study was to examine the eﬀects on the distribution of household
disposable income of various income maintenance programmes. Our benchmark
scenario was the current situation in Switzerland, and the various schemes examined
were a full NIT allowance, a partial NIT allowance, a participation income covering
50% of subsistence costs, an income support scheme which topped up household
resources to the level of subsistence expenditure and ﬁnally a (simpliﬁed) earned
income tax credit. We were interested in capturing the eﬀect of introducing such
schemes on income inequality and poverty. However, we also wanted to examine
the eﬀect of the various income maintenance schemes on the overall level of social
welfare. To address this last point, it was particularly important to model household
labour supply responses to the alternative budget constraints entailed by the tax
and beneﬁt schedules of the various policy scenarios studied here.
By deﬁnition, the full NIT granting an allowance equal to subsistence needs was
designed to eliminate poverty. The resulting scheme was shown to reduce income
inequality most drastically. The ordinal analysis of income distributions also al-
l o w e du st oe s t a b l i s ht h a ti nc o m p a r i s o nt ot h ec u r r e n ts i t u a t i o ni nS w i t z e r l a n d ,
the bottom 65% group would unambiguously beneﬁt from the introduction of a full
NIT allowance. However, such an income maintenance scheme is expensive to fund:
our results suggest that an integrated federal linear tax rate of 62% is required to
make it viable. Under such taxation, aggregate work hours are reduced by 10% and
average disposable income falls by 9.3%.
The partial NIT allowance is less generous in terms of social assistance, and is
accordingly less eﬀective than the full NIT allowance in reducing poverty and in-
equality. However, it also entails a smaller, though still signiﬁcant, 5.9% sacriﬁce of
total income for it to be viable. The participation income was designed to restrict
the income allowance (50% of subsistence needs) to families with all adults in em-
ployment. Again, this last scheme was less eﬀective than the full and partial NIT
allowances in reducing poverty and inequality. However, of all the schemes exam-
ined in this paper, the participation income was the only scenario that resulted in an
unambiguous social welfare improvement over the distribution of income pertaining
to our benchmark scenario.
Finally, we discuss some limitations of our analysis, some of which may present
22directions for further research. Our family utility model abstracted from problems
of rationing; i.e. unemployment, taking the state of not working as synonym to non-
participation. Likewise, we have simpliﬁed our analysis by assuming non-existence
of welfare stigma on the side of claimants. We have also ignored the administrative
costs required to evaluate the situations of families with respect to the schemes that
were designed to top up resources to the target subsistence level. In this respect,
our results may have over-estimated the costs of operating variants of the negative
income tax, and likewise may have under-estimated the tax revenues required to top
up resources in relation to our two means tested schemes.
Our analysis has omitted two major socio-economic groups: the self-employed
and individuals on retirement. It is not likely that schemes that provide incentives
for participation such as the participation income and earned income tax credit
will have much impact on the decision of the elderly to take up employment again.
However, it is clear that occupational choices between salaried employment and self-
employment may be very much inﬂuenced by the existing structure of social safety
nets. One major extension of our analysis therefore could consist in modelling
occupational choices and work decisions jointly using a sample of salaried and self-
employed workers. Then, it is expected that this additional source of heterogeneity
will result in larger reactions of households in terms of both income and hours
changes in the face of the alternative policy scenarios considered here.
Our microsimulation exercises were undertaken, as is most often the case, as-
suming that policy reforms did not impact on the demand for labour, so that hourly
(pre-tax) wages could be held constant across scenarios. This is certainly one im-
portant limitation of this type of partial equilibrium modelling of policy reform. In
the current state of science, general equilibrium modelling however implies a greater
degree of aggregation of families into broad socio-economic categories. In this sense,
there is therefore perhaps the beneﬁt of realism kept in the partial equilibrium mi-
crosimulation exercise, at the cost of some simplifying assumptions.
23A Technical Appendix
Partial-equilibrium microsimulation relies on the assumption that wages of house-
hold members and non-labour income are exogenous. An exogenous change in social
security beneﬁts or taxes aﬀects the net income that can be obtained in the diﬀer-
ent employment states. Each household then reconsiders its labour supply decision
(see below) and chooses the new resulting optimal employment state. Changes in
hours as well as the pre-reform and post-reform income distribution provide the
main ingredients for the evaluation of the incentive and distributional eﬀects of the
envisaged policy changes.
A.1 Discrete choice modelling
We have used the Swiss expenditure and income survey of 1998 as our data base
for modelling labour supply responses (see Appendix B for further detail). Coupled
with a tax beneﬁt module (see Section A.2 below), we have used the same data
base for simulating the eﬀects of various tax reform scenarios on the labour market
and the distribution of income. We have estimated separate models for families
comprising a single adult and two parent families. Our model focuses on the decision
to take up a part-time or full-time job as an employee. Households in independent
employment or on retirement are thus excluded from the analysis. Our main concern
is to characterize labour force participation decisions between various employment
states.
Our maintained assumption throughout this study is that employment states
are discrete. People do not choose freely to vary their hours of work continuously,
but rather, they can choose to work part-time, or full-time. We have used the dis-
tribution of work hours to deﬁne what may be sensible deﬁnitions of the discrete
employment states for males and females. Our canonical setup is McFadden’s condi-
tional logit model (McFadden, 1974). Let there be l alternatives the ith unit chooses
from, denoted as eij. Under McFadden’s model, the probability that alternative j is
chosen is given by the form
Pr(eij =1 |xi ,w ij)=
exp(x 




iβ + w 
ijγ)
(1)
where xi are individual speciﬁc variables to unit i,a n dwij are attributes of the
individual conditional on the jth alternative being chosen. In our framework, eij =1
if a particular employment state is chosen (for instance the individual does not
24participate in the labour market) and eij = 0 for all j   = j.
The utility function we use to characterize choice is a standard quadratic form.
Consider ﬁrst single adult households. If we let h denote labour supply and y the
family’s disposable income, the utility function takes the form
u(y,h)=αyyy
2 + αhhh
2 + αhyyh+ βyy + βhh (2)
If c denotes a money ﬁxed costs of employment, the variable y in (2) is to be replaced
by y − c.
The extension to two parent families is straightforward. We now deﬁne utility
over the family’s disposable income y, and the work hours of husband and wife,
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If cf and cm denote money ﬁxed costs of employment for female and male partners,
the variable y in (3) is to be replaced by y − cf − cm.
There has been in recent years considerable emphasis placed on the existing
heterogeneity inherent in the processes generating labour supply responses. Separate
models are estimated here for single and two adult families. We also allow for
further heterogeneity in two diﬀerent ways. Firstly, we specify the βy parameters to
depend on family characteristics. Secondly, we also allow for heterogeneity in the
costs of work c parameters.16 As such, two limitations of our empirical framework
may be stated. Firstly, we do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity in structural
parameters (on this, see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Secondly, while we do allow
for costs of working, these may be increasing (and concave) in hours of work, as
emphasized by Heim and Meyer (2004), whereas we have speciﬁed these to be ﬁxed.
Estimation results for two parent and single adult families earning wages are
reported in Tables A1 and A2 respectively.
16The βy parameter is made a function of demographic variables such as the age and education
of the household head as well as dummies pertaining to the number and age structure of children
under the age of eleven. For two parent families, the ﬁxed costs of female employment are made
a function of child demographics. Our preferred speciﬁcation does not include ﬁxed costs of male
employment.
25A.2 Tax beneﬁt module
A tax beneﬁt routine is used in order to model in some detail the budget constraints
faced by households under the alternative policy scenarios. Taxes in Switzerland are
levied at the cantonal level and at the federal level. Separate tax schedules operate in
each of the twenty six Cantons that constitute Switzerland. The routine integrates
this heterogeneity in taxation since it includes a federal income tax schedule and
separate tax schedules for each canton.17 We also control for civil status (since
diﬀerent tax schedules apply to married and unmarried couples) and family size in
the calculation of tax payments.
Compared to countries where detailed tax-beneﬁt models have been developed
(e.g. EUROMOD for several European countries), Switzerland presents the diﬃ-
culty of a highly decentralized federal structure. For our purposes, the income tax
data reported in the survey used in the present study appeared to be rather unreli-
able. We have therefore decided to estimate (average) tax rate functions using data
provided by the Administration f´ ed´ erale des contributions (AFC, 1999) on income
tax payments for typical households in 1998.18
Consider ﬁrst federal income taxes. AFC (1999) provides a collection of data
points on the federal income tax burden of single individuals at various income
levels. The same source provides also a comparable plot for families comprising two
adults and two dependent children, and for couples without children. We have used
these data points to estimate federal income tax schedules pertaining to lone adults,
on the one hand, and married couples (or single-adult families), on the other hand.
For our estimations, it was important to select a functional form that ensures that
the average tax rate is non-decreasing everywhere in order to ensure progressivity.
We have therefore selected a generalized logistic function, taking the form
τF(η)=m a x





where η is gross household income and τF is the federal tax rate function. Al-
17Within cantons, there are also municipal taxes which are set as a proportion of cantonal taxes;
the factor of proportionality may vary from one municipality to the other. The reform of local
taxation not being a primary concern for this study, we have chosen in the routine to apply a
representative municipal tax schedule within each canton.
18Taxes have been reestimated for three reasons. First, the Swiss tax system is very complex and
includes 26 distinct cantonal schedules. Second, the observed taxes in the data are not consistent
with the tax schedules. For example, in the data we ﬁnd many cases where the taxable income
after deductions is larger than the gross income inclusive of beneﬁt entitlements. This casts some
doubts about the exactness of the reported tax data. Third, the estimation of these taxes simpliﬁes
the way we can simulate the reform scenarios.
26though it represents a signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation, this speciﬁcation yields a very good
approximation of the original piece-wise linear average tax schedule.
To accommodate the presence of families with diﬀering numbers of children, the
two data ﬁles pertaining to married persons were merged in order to estimate a
general tax schedule τF(y−nδ), where n now denotes the number of children in the
family. This procedure amounts to a form of demographic translation of resources
by substracting a (constant) amount δ per child living in the family.
In order to account also for income taxes levied at the cantonal and municipal
levels, we have repeated the exercise pertaining to the federal income tax for each of
the canton data ﬁles (including average municipal taxes) provided by AFC (1999),
thus estimating separate tax schedules for singles, and for families.
The module also computes payroll taxes; that is contributions towards pension
funds and unemployment insurance. Other compulsory income deductions such as
health insurance payments are also taken into account. We also compute social
insurance entitlements, in particular contributions to health insurance payments.
B Data appendix
We have used the Swiss expenditure and income survey of 1998, ERC98, as our
data base for modelling labour supply responses. Coupled with our tax beneﬁt
module, we have used the same data base for simulating the eﬀects of various tax
reform scenarios on the labour market and the distribution of income. The Swiss
expenditure and income survey of 1998 has been designed by the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce as a representative sample of the Swiss population. Details on sampling
design, coverage and scope of the survey are to be found in Oﬃce F´ ed´ eral de la
Statistique (1999).
We have split the sample into three ﬁles. The ﬁrst ﬁle pertains to single adult
households (with or without dependent children) where the family head is a salaried
worker, or seeking employment and available for work. The second ﬁle pertains to
two adult households, where again, the household head is a salaried worker or is
seeking employment. A residual third ﬁle pertaining to households in independent
employment or on retirement, is not used in the study. Our analysis being concerned
with the labour market and the distribution of income, we have not made use of
the data pertaining to households on retirement. We have also excluded individuals
exercising independent employment because it was diﬃcult to treat their earnings
and taxable income data as being reliable.
27Recognizing the collective nature of labour supply decisions in two-adult house-
holds, we have speciﬁed and estimated separate models for these and for single adult
households. The latter ﬁle contained for the larger part individuals without chil-
dren. Because of their small number, lone parents with children were also assigned
to the ﬁle of single adults, even though their labour supply cannot fully be treated
as equivalent to that of adults without children.
Note one further point. Before estimating the labour supply model, we require a
methodology for predicting the wages of non-participating individuals. This method
can be broken down into two steps. Firstly, we use an econometric selection model
to predict the expected log-wage, logwi, of an individual, conditional on the person
being observed in the employment state of non-participation. Secondly, the pre-
dicted wage is obtained from the predicted expected log-wage  logwi of the ﬁrst step
as exp(  logwi+ˆ σ2/2), where exp is the exponential function and ˆ σ2 is the estimated
variance of  logw (the estimated variance of predicted log-wages for those observed
to be in the employment state of non-participation).
B.1 The sample of single adult families
As we are working with discrete choice models, we have had to deﬁne what we mean
exactly by part time and full time employment. We have used the distribution
of work hours in the ERC98 survey to deﬁne two employment states for single
individual households. Non participation, NP, was assigned to those who reported
zero work hours. For individuals working up to 20 hours we have retained a part
time employment state PT, while those working 21 to 39 hours were assigned to
a small full time employment state FT1, and those working 40 to 80 hours were
classiﬁed under the deﬁnition FT2,t a k i n gt os i g n i f yalarge full time load. In the
utility function, we have set NP at zero work hours, PT at 15 hours, FT1 at 31
hours and FT2 at 42 hours.
The tax-beneﬁt module was then used to convert the gross income pertaining
to these theoretical work hours, into a post-transfer net income, comprising taxes,
social security contributions and the various income support schemes retained in
this study. There were few cases of weekly employment exceeding 80 hours. These
data (and those with missing observations) were dropped from the analysis. There
were in total 1875 observations in this ﬁle.
28B.2 The sample of two adult families
For two adult families we have deﬁned separate employment states for husbands and
wives.19 Given the shapes of the distributions of reported hours, we have considered
three employment states for husbands, namely NP,FT1,FT2, while for wives we
retained alongside non-participation two part-time employment states and a unique
full time deﬁnition: NP,PT1,PT2,FT.
Taking wives ﬁrst, we have deﬁned PT1 as the state of working up to 14 hours,
PT2 for wives working between 15 and 28 hours, and FT for wives working 29 hours
or more. In the family utility function, we have set PT1 t o7h o u r s ,PT2 to 21 hours
and FT to 42 hours.
For husbands, all persons working up to 41 hours weekly were assigned to the
state FT1, and those working in excess of 41 hours were allocated to the state FT2.
In the family utility function, we have set FT1 to 37.5 work hours while FT2 was
assigned 44 hours.
For both husband and wife, the value NP was set to zero work hours. In fur-
ther estimations we have maintained the same deﬁnitions (i.e. cut-oﬀ values) of
employment states, but considered alternative valuations of the husband’s states
in the utility function. There was less variation of employment hours for wives,
and the values selected for PT1,PT2,FT corresponded well with local modes of the
distribution of work hours.
There were in total 3559 observations in this ﬁle.
19For simplicity, we refer to “husbands” and “wives” despite the fact that not all couples are
married. It is also to be noted that there are some households with more than two working adults.
In these cases, the incomes of the additional adults are treated as exogenous.
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Figure 1: Means tests, participation requirements and reform scenarios 
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Figure 2: Budget constraints for partial and full NIT allowance
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base incsupp nit50F nit100fFigure 6: Social welfare test 
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Variation in yearly hours worked (scenario pi50f relative to base)
Figure 10: Histogram of changes in yearly work hours (scenarios nit50f and pi50f
relative to base)
Note: Data plots refer only to households who experience non zero changes in hours of work. In
scenario nit50f (pi50f ), they represent 11.7% of all households (10.4%).Table 1
Policy scenarios
Scenario Participation condition
Income subsidy / 
allowance
Flat tax region Miscellaneous
base ___ _
flat tax __
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal tax schedule 
by a unique flat tax
flat taxf __
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal, cantonal and 
municipal income taxation
nit50f _
50% of subsistence 
expenditure
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal, cantonal and 
municipal income taxation
nit100f _ subsistence expenditure 
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal, cantonal and 
municipal income taxation
pi50f
Positive earnings for each 
adult
50% of subsistence 
expenditure
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal, cantonal and 
municipal income taxation
inc supp _
income top-up with marginal 
tax rate of 100% up to 
subsistence expenditure
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal tax schedule 
by a unique flat tax
eitc100
Positive earnings for each 
adult
same as incsupp
as of subsistence 
expenditure 
replaces federal tax schedule 
by a unique flat taxTable 2






3 av. disposable 
income
4
flat tax rate     
t hours
4
base 0.149 0.211 0.033 0.002 0.00% _ 0.00%
Panel A: major reforms involving an integrated tax system
flat taxf 0.152 0.216 0.024 0.002 0.14% 28.69% 0.03%
nit50f 0.084 0.162 0.011 0.001 -5.87% 51.34% -6.42%
nit100f 0.057 0.135 0.00 0.00 -9.25% 62.17% -10.04%
pi50f 0.127 0.189 0.017 0.002 0.45% 42.09% 0.62%
Panel B: reforms involving a change in federal taxation only
flat tax 0.155 0.217 0.034 0.002 0.16% 4.91% 0.38%
inc supp 0.139 0.219 0.00 0.00 -2.35% 9.11% -3.21%
eitc100 0.152 0.215 0.031 0.002 -0.02% 6.69% -0.03%
1 The Atkinson index IA sets ε at 2.
2  Subsistence expenditure = Fr 23689
3 The Pα index (Foster et al., 1984) sets α at 2.
4 Relative change with respect to base case.Table 3
Inequality Orderings






























(Fi ,Fj)= (-,q) means Fi is less unequal than F j up to q
th decile.0
Table 4
Poverty Orderings (Z ∈ [0;50'000])





















































(Fi ,Fj)= [-,z0] means Fi has less poverty than Fj for all poverty lines in the [0;z ] interval.Table 5 
Participation and hours of work: scenarios nit50f and pi50f
base nit50f pi50f
Participation rate
Overall participation rate 0.817 0.782 0.852
couples - male 0.959 0.947 0.961
couples - female 0.625 0.568 0.711
singles 0.906 0.867 0.910
Change in weekly hours of work (relative to base, in hours)
a
Average change -1.94 0.19
couples - male -0.61 0.02
NP
b 0.041 3.86 3.13
FT1 0.270 -0.16 0.47
FT2 0.689 -1.05 -0.35
couples - female -3.09 0.77
NP 0.375 0.49 4.80
PT1 0.132 -0.23 -0.01
PT2 0.186 -1.95 -0.30
FT 0.307 -9.40 -3.17
singles -2.25 -0.55
NP 0.094 1.11 2.60
PT 0.070 -0.24 -0.11
FT1 0.171 -3.01 -0.39
FT2 0.665 -2.74 -1.08
a The italic numbers under the heading "base" indicate the structure of employment in 
the base scenario. Therefore these numbers add to one for each category of individuals.
b These acronyms denote the initial employment state, e.g., NP denotes "non 
participation" in the base scenario, FT1 a "small" full time in the base scenario, PT part 
time work etc.. See the data appendix for details.Table 6 





poor not poor total
base poor 0.003 0.031 0.033
not poor 0.009 0.958 0.967
total 0.011 0.989 1.000
pi50f
poor not poor total
base poor 0.015 0.018 0.033
not poor 0.001 0.966 0.967
total 0.017 0.983 1.000
a TheCSIAS poverty line is equal to 23690 CHF. Table A1: Estimates for couples with ﬁxed costs of working
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error z-stat
y2 -0.014 0.002 -7.19
h2
f 0.598 0.056 10.67
h2
m 0.786 0.080 9.82
yh f -0.065 0.010 -6.47
yh m -0.057 0.015 -3.82
hm hf -0.210 0.067 -3.14
y -0.146 0.078 -1.88
y× age 0.082 0.004 20.77
y× (age2/1000) -0.001 0.000 -22.35
y× 1(less than 11 years schooling) -0.095 0.037 -2.59
y× # children under 10 years -0.254 0.019 -13.55
y× 1(child 0-2 years) -0.117 0.050 -2.36
y× 1(child 3-5 years) -0.093 0.058 -1.61
hm -0.577 0.249 -2.32
hf -1.110 0.174 -6.37
Fixed costs (female work)
constant 0.054 0.122 0.45
× # children under 10 0.369 0.127 2.89
× 1(child 0-2 years) 1.620 0.284 5.70
× 1(child 3-5 years) 1.389 0.334 4.16
Log-likelihood -6602.01
Size of sample 3559Table A2: Estimates for singles with ﬁxed costs of working
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error z-stat
y2 -0.033 0.008 -4.28
h2 0.742 0.106 7.02
yh -0.196 0.037 -5.32
y 0.049 0.444 0.11
y× age 0.062 0.020 3.04
y× (age2/1000) -0.001 0.000 -3.63
y× 1(university education) -0.164 0.065 -2.53
y× 1(less than 11 years schooling) -0.359 0.063 -5.67
y× # children under 10 years -0.481 0.085 -5.67
y× 1(child 0-2 years) -0.241 0.185 -1.30
y× 1(child 3-5 years) 0.235 0.211 1.12
y× 1(female) 0.618 0.063 9.75
y× 1(Swiss citizen) -0.025 0.076 -0.33
h -0.435 0.283 -1.54
Fixed costs of work 1.164 0.278 4.19
Log-likelihood -1466.05
Size of sample 1875Publications récentes du Département d’économétrie 
peuvent être obtenues à l’adresse suivante : 
Université de Genève 
UNI MAIL 
A l'att. de Mme Caroline Schneeberger 
Département d'économétrie 
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve 
CH - 1211 Genève 4 
ou sur 
INTERNET : http//www.unige.ch/ses/metri/cahiers 
 
 
2007.02  RITSCHARD Gilbert, Djamel A. ZIGHED, Lucio BACCARO, Irini 
GEORGIOU, Vincent PISETTA and Matthias STUDER, Mining Expert 
Comments on the Application of ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association 
and Collective Bargaining, November 2007, 48 pages. 
 
2007.01  KRISHNAKUMAR Jaya and Tobias MÜLLER, Participation and voting 
behavior in a direct democracy : a structural model of migration policy in 
Switzerland, Mai 2007, 36 pages. 
 
2006.07  KRISHNAKUMAR Jaya and David NETO, Estimation and Testing in Threshold 
Cointegrated Systems Using Reduced Rank Regression, November 2006, 23 
pages. 
 
2006.06  ZOIA Maria Grazia, A New Algebraic Approach to Reprensentation Theorems 
for (Co)integrated Processes up to the Second Order, Octobre 2006, 22 pages. 
 
2006.05  MILLS FLEMMING Joanna, Eva CANTONI, Christopher FIELD and Ian 
MCLAREN, Extracting Long-Term Patterns of Population Changes from 
Sporadic Counts of Migrant Birds, Juin 2006, 23 pages. 
 
2006.04  LÔ Serigne N. and Elvezio RONCHETTI, Robust Small Sample Accurate 
Inference in Moment Condition Models, Juin 2006, 33 pages. 
 
2006.03  LÔ Serigne N. and Elvezio RONCHETTI, Robust Second Order Accurate 
Inference for Generalized Linear Models, Mai 2006, 29 pages. 
 
2006.02  CANTONI Eva, Joanna MILLS FLEMMING and Elvezio RONCHETTI, 
Variable Selection in Additive Models by Nonnegative Garrote, Avril 2006, 
17 pages. 
 
2006.01  COPT Samuel and Stephane HERITIER, Robust MM-Estimation and Inference in 
Mixed Linear Models, Janvier 2006, 27 pages. Published in Biometrics (2007). 
 
2005.04  KRISHNAKUMAR Jaya and David NETO, Partial Cointegration, Novembre 
2005 (revised August 2006), 25 pages. 